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Abstract
Lateral movement of advanced persistent threats (APTs) has posed a severe security challenge. Static segregation
at separate times and spatial locations is not sufficient to protect valuable assets from stealthy and persistent attackers.
Defenders need to consider time and stages holistically to discover the latent attack path across a large time-scale
and achieve long-term security for the target assets. In this work, we propose a random time-expanded network to
model the stochastic service requests in the enterprise network and the persistent lateral movement over stages. We
design cognitive honeypots at idle production nodes to detect and deter the adversarial lateral movement and protect
the target node proactively and persistently. To increase the honeypots’ stealthiness, the location of the honeypot
changes randomly at different times and stages. Based on the probability of service links and the likelihood of
successful compromises, the defender can design the optimal honeypot policy that minimizes the long-term cyber
risks of the target assets and the probability of interference and roaming cost. We propose an iterative algorithm
and approximate the vulnerability with the union bound for computationally efficient deployment of honeypots.
The vulnerability analysis results under the optimal and heuristic honeypot policies demonstrate that the proposed
cognitive honeypot can effectively protect the target node from the lateral movement attack.
Index Terms
Advanced persistent threats Lateral movement Time-expanded network Cognitive honeypot Dynamic security
Risk analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a critical security challenge to enterprise networks
due to their stealthy, persistent, and sophisticated nature. The life cycle of APT attacks consists of multiple phases
[1], [2]. After the initial intrusion by phishing emails, social engineering, or an infected USB, the attacker enters the
enterprise network from an external network domain. Then, the attacker establishes a foothold, escalates privileges,
and moves laterally in the enterprise network to search for valuable assets as his final target. The targeted assets
can be either a database with confidential information or a controller for an industrial plant as shown in the instance
of APT27 [3] and Stuxnet, respectively. Since valuable assets are usually segregated and cannot be compromised
by an attacker from the external domain directly in the initial intrusion phase, it is indispensable for the attacker
to exploit the internal network flows to move laterally from the location of the initial intrusion to the final target
of the valuable assets.
Early detection of the adversarial lateral movement can deter APTs in the cradle yet is challenging due to the
persistence and stealthiness of an APT attack and alert fatigue. First, an APT attacker is persistent. The long time
duration between the initial intrusion and the final target compromise makes it difficult for the defender to relate
alarms over a time-scale of years and piece together shreds of evidence to identify the attack path. Second, an APT
attack is stealthy. Each time the attacker has compromised a new network entity such as a host and obtained its
root privilege, he does not launch any subversive actions to the compromised entity and remains “under the radar”.
These entities are only used as the attacker’s stepping stones for the final target compromise. Third, the high volume
of network traffic during regular operation generates a considerable number of false alarms, and thus significantly
delay and reduce the accuracy of adversary detection. Without accurate and timely detection of adversarial lateral
movement, defensive methods such as patching and resetting all suspicious entities with high frequency become
cost-prohibitive and largely reduce operational efficiency as all those entities become unavailable for the incoming
service requests.
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2Honeypot is a promising active defense method by deception. A honeypot is a monitored and regulated trap that
is disguised to be a valuable asset for the attacker to compromise. Since legitimate users do not have the motivation
to access a honeypot, any inbound network traffic directly reveals the attack with negligible false alarms. The
off-the-shelf honeypots are applied at fixed locations and on isolated machines that are never involved in the
regular operation. Configuring honeypots at fixed locations are simple and inexpensive while isolating the honeypot
completely from the production system can achieve a zero risk of an attacker using the honeypot as a pivot node [4].
Despite the above two benefits, honeypots at fixed and isolated locations can be easily identified by sophisticated
attackers, such as APTs, [5] and become ineffective.
Motivated by the concept of cognitive radio [6] and the roaming honeypot [7], we develop the concept of
cognitive honeypots to mitigate the long-term cyber risks of a target asset during the adversarial lateral movement.
Contrary to the off-the-shelf honeypots, the cognitive honeypots are applied to idle machines of the production
system with random changing locations to make the honeypot indecipherable and unpredictable for the attacker.
Since the defender reconfigures a part of the production systems as honeypots, she needs to guarantee that the no
honeypot configuration interferes with service requests generated during the regular operation. Also, the defender
needs to balance security with the cost of changing the honeypot location and reconfiguring the involving entities.
We manage to consider the above three factors, i.e., the level of stealthiness/indecipherability, the probability of
interference, and the cost of roaming, in determining the optimal honeypot policy that minimizes the target node’s
long-term vulnerability (LTV).
In this work, we model the adversarial lateral movement in the enterprise network as a time-expanded network
[8], where the additional temporal links reveal the attack path explicitly.We consider the scenario where service
links happen randomly at each time stage and the attacker can exploit these service links for lateral movement
with a given success probability. To compute the optimal policy for the cognitive honeypot efficiently, we propose
an iterative algorithm and approximate the LTV by its upper and lower bounds, which results in pessimistic and
optimistic honeypot policies, respectively. Besides these optimal policies, we also analyze the LTV under other
heuristic honeypot policies. The analysis provides critical thresholds and quantitative bounds which can help the
defender to analyze the LTV under the given system parameters such as the probability of service links and the
attacker’s success probability. Moreover, if the defender can control the arrival probability of service links and affect
the success probability, the analysis further indicates the direction to modify these parameters to achieve long-term
security.
A. Related Works
1) Lateral Movement and Long-term Security: The attacker’s stealthy and persistent lateral movement poses a
severe security challenge. Since the attacker can remain undetected in the compromised nodes for a long time,
a network that is secure at any separate stages may become insecure if the times and the spatial locations are
considered holistically. Thus, defenders need to pursue long-term security in lieu of static security and aim to
reduce the long-term vulnerability of their valuable assets. Previous works, such as [9], [10], and [11], which focus
on the detection of, the risk analysis under, and the response to lateral movement, respectively, have considered the
dynamic aspects yet not explicitly. Our work manages to capture the explicit relationship between the time stages
and the spatial locations of the legitimate network flows and the adversarial lateral movement, which enables the
defender to compute the target node’s LTV under an arbitrary length of the time window.
2) Cognitive Honeypots: Honeypots as a defensive deception method have been widely studied from various
aspects. The authors in [4], [12] have investigated the optimal timing and actions to attract and engage attackers in
the honeypot. The authors in [13] have investigated the optimal honeypot configuration and the signaling mechanism
to incentivize attackers and disincentivize legitimate users to access a honeypot simultaneously. All these honeypots
are assumed to have fixed and segregated locations. In this work, we consider cognitive honeypots that use the
idle machines of the production system to increase the stealthiness of honeypots. The terminology of “cognitive
honeypots” has appeared in [14] but refers to a cognition of the suspicion level. The authors in [15] have investigated
the optimal honeypot locations during the adversarial lateral movement to prevent the attacker from compromising
the target node. Their honeypot policy requires a partial observation of the state, which may not be available as a
result of the attacker’s stealthiness. Our work assumes that the defender does not know whether, when, or where
the initial intrusion and the lateral movement occur in the network. Without real-time feedback information such as
3TABLE I: Summary of notations.
Variable Meaning
V = {VU ,VH} Node set of users and hosts
N = |V | Number of user and host nodes
VI ⊆ V The node-set of potential initial intrusion
VD ⊆ V The node-set that can be reconfigured as honeypots
VS ⊆ V The set of all the subsets of V
n j0 ∈ V \VI The target node that contain valuable assets
∆k ∈ Z+0 The length of the time window
ρi The probability that the initial intrusion occurs at node ni ∈ VI
β The probability / frequency of service links
λ The probability of a successful compromise
γ The probability of honey links
alerts of node compromise, the cognitive honeypot is a proactive defense method to protect the target node against
adversarial lateral movement.
3) Time-Expanded Network: Time-expanded networks have been applied in transportation [16], satellite com-
munications [17], social networks [18], and network security [19]. Since the transportation planning and satellite
communications follow a timetable, the time-expanded networks in these applications usually have time-varying
links that are deterministic and known at all time stages. We consider a large enterprise network and assume that the
defender does not know which service requests will occur at each future stage. Thus, we consider a time-expanded
network with random topology. Comparing to high-level dynamic and stochastic models such as [1], [15], the
time-expanded network provides an explicit temporal dimension to understand the timing of service requests and
lateral movement.
B. Notation and Organization of the Paper
Throughout this paper, we use the pronoun ‘he’ for the attacker and ‘she’ for the defender. The superscript
represents the time index. The calligraphic letter V represents a set and V \VI means the set of elements in V but
not in VI . We summarize important notations in Table. I for readers’ convenience. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II introduces the time-expanded network to model lateral movement, the random arrival of the
service links, and the cognitive honeypot. In Section III, we compute the optimal honeypot policy regularized by
the level of stealthiness, the probability of interference, and the cost of roaming. The LTV of the target node is
then analyzed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. CHRONOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE NETWORK MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we model the normal operation of an enterprise network as a series of user-host networks in
chronological order. Nodes U1 and U2 represent the two users’ client computers. Nodes H1, H2, and H3 represent
the three hosts in the network. In particular, host H3 stores confidential information or serves as a controller for
a critical actuator. Define V := {VU ,VH} as the node set where VU ,VH is the set of the user nodes and hosts,
respectively. The solid arrows represent two types of service links, i.e., the user-host connections and the host-host
communications through an application such as HTTP [20]. Users such as U1 and U2 can access non-confidential
hosts, such as H1 and H2, through their client computers for upload and/or download requests. However, to prevent
data theft and physical damages, host H3 is inaccessible to users; e.g., there are no service links from U1 or U2 to
H3 at any time stage k. Since the normal operation requires data exchanges among hosts, directed network flows
exist among hosts at different times; e.g., H3 has an outbound connection to H2 at time k = k0 and an inbound
connection from H2 at time k = k0+3. We assume that both types of service links occur randomly and last for a
random but finite duration. Whenever there is a change of network topology, i.e., adding or deleting the user-host
and host-host links, we define it as a new stage. Thus, we can characterize the chronological network as a series
of user-host networks at discrete times k = k0,k0+1, · · · ,k0+∆k, where the initial stage k0 ∈ Z+ and ∆k ∈ Z+0 .
A. Time-Expanded Network and Random Service Links
We abstract the series of networks in Fig. 1 from k∈ {k0, · · · ,k0+∆k} as a time-expanded network G =(V ,E ,∆k)
in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1: A series of user-host networks with different service links in chronological order under the discrete time-
index k. The initial stage k0 is the stage of the attacker’s initial compromise and the defender does not know the
value of k0. The solid arrows show the direction of the user-host and host-host network flows. The dashed arrows
represent the temporal links in sets E k.
In the time-expanded network, we distinguish the same user or host node by the stage k and define nki ∈ V
as the i-th node in set V at stage k ∈ {k0, · · · ,k0 +∆k}. We drop the superscript k if we refer to the node rather
than the node at stage k or the time does not matter. We can assume that the number of nodes N := |V | does
not change with time without loss of generality as we can let V contain all the potential users and hosts in the
enterprise network over ∆k stages. The link set E := {E k0 , · · · ,E k0+∆k}∪{E k0C , · · · ,E k0+∆k−1C } consists of two parts.
On the one hand, the user-host and host-host connections at each stage k ∈ {k0, · · · ,k0 +∆k} are represented by
the set E k = {e(nki ,nkj) ∈ {0,1}|nki ,nkj ∈ V , i 6= j,∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,N}}. On the other hand, set E kC := {e(nki ,nk+1i ) =
1|nki ,nk+1i ∈ V ,∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,N}} contains the virtual temporal links from stage k to k+1. A link exists if e(·, ·) = 1
and does not if e(·, ·) = 0. The time-expanded network G is always a directed graph due to the temporal causality
represented by the set E kC ,k ∈ {k0, · · · ,k0+∆k−1}.
Since the user-host and the host-host connections happen randomly at each stage, we assume that a service link
from node nki ∈ V to node nkj ∈ V \ {nki } exists with probability βi, j ∈ [0,1] for any stage k ∈ {k0, · · · ,k0 +∆k}.
If a connection from node nki to n
k
j is prohibitive; e.g., U1 cannot access H3 in Fig. 1, then βi, j = 0. We can
define β := {βi, j}, i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,N}, as the service-link generating matrix without loss of generality by letting
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Fig. 2: Time-expanded network G = {V ,E ,∆k} for the adversarial lateral movement and the cognitive honeypot
configuration. The solid, dashed, double-lined arrows represent the service links, the temporal connections, and the
honey links to honeypots, respectively. The shadowed nodes reveal the attack path from U1 to H3 explicitly over
∆k = 3 stages.
βi,i = 0,∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,N}. The service links at each stage may only involve a small number of nodes and leave other
nodes idle defined as follows.
Definition 1. A node nki ∈ V is said to be idle if it does not participate in any service links at stage k, i.e.,
e(nki ,n
k
j) = 0,e(n
k
j,n
k
i ) = 0,∀nkj ∈ V .
B. Attack Model of Lateral Movement over Large Time Scale
We assume that the initial intrusion can only happen at a subset of N nodes VI ⊆ V due to the network
segregation. Take Fig. 1 as an example, if all hosts in the enterprise network are segregated from the Internet, the
initial intrusion can only happen to the client computer of U1 or U2 through phishing emails or social engineering.
Although network segregation narrows down the potential location of initial intrusion from V to the subset VI that
can be a single node, it is still challenging for the defender to prevent the nodes in VI from an initial intrusion as
the defender cannot determine when the initial intrusion happens; i.e., the value of k0 is unknown. In this work, we
assume that the initial intrusion only happens to one node in set VI at a time; i.e., no concurrent intrusions happen.
Once the attacker has entered the enterprise network via the initial intrusion from an external network domain, he
does not launch new intrusions from the external domain to compromise more nodes in VI . Instead, the attacker can
exploit the internal service links to move laterally over time, which is much stealthier than intrusions from external
network domains. For example, after the attacker has controlled U1’s computer by phishing emails, he should not
send phishing emails to other users, which increase his probability of being detected. We define ρi ∈ [0,1] as the
probability that the initial intrusion happens at node nk0i ∈ VI for all k0 ∈Z+ and ∑i∈VI ρi = 1 holds. This probability
can be estimated based on the node’s vulnerability assessed by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
[21].
6After the initial intrusion, the attacker can exploit service links at different stages to move laterally. Once the
attacker compromises a node by obtaining its root privilege, the privilege is retained for the attacker in all the
following stages. Thus, the attacker can launch simultaneous attacks from all the compromised nodes to move
laterally whenever there are outbound service links from them. If there are multiple service links from one
compromised node, the attacker can also compromise all the sink nodes of these service links within the stage. Note
that the only objective of the attacker is to search for valuable nodes such as H3 by lateral movement, compromise
it, and then launch subversive attacks for data theft and physical damages. Thus, we assume that the attack does
not launch any subversive attacks in all the compromised nodes except at the target node to remain stealthy. Even
though the attacker retains the root privileges of all these compromised nodes, he only uses them as stepping stones
to reach the target node.
The persistent lateral movement over a long time period enables the attacker to reach and compromise segregated
nodes that are not in the initial intrusion set VI . In both Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, although the network has no direct
service links, represented by solid arrows, from U1 to H3 at each stage, the cascade of static security in all stages
does not result in long-term security over ∆k = 3 stages. After we add the temporal links represented by the dashed
arrows, we can see the attack path from the initial intrusion node U1 to the target node H3 over ∆k = 3 stages as
highlighted by the shadows in Fig. 2 by considering the times and the spatial locations holistically. The temporal
order of the service links affects the likelihood that the attacker can compromise the target node. For example, if
we exchange the services links that happen at stage k0+1 and stage k0+2, then the attacker from node U1 cannot
reach H3 in ∆k = 3 stages. However, the attacker can always compromise the target node after a sufficiently long
time as long as the attacker can move laterally along service links, compromise nodes stealthily without triggering
alerts, and control the compromised nodes persistently.
The adversarial exploitation of service links is not always successful. Moreover, the attacker may choose not to
compromise a service link due to the existence of the honey link as introduced in Section II-C. Thus, if the attacker
has compromised nodes nk
′
i ∈ V ,k′ < k, before stage k and a service link from nki to nkj ∈ V \{nki } exists at stage k,
i.e., e(nki ,n
k
j) = 1, we can define λi, j ∈ [0,1] as the probability that the attacker at node nki chooses to compromise
node nkj at any stage k ∈ {k0, · · · ,k0+∆k} and successfully obtain the root privilege of node nkj within stage k.
C. Cognitive Honeypot
The lateral movement of persistent and stealthy attacks makes the enterprise network insecure in the long run.
The high rates of false alarms and the miss detection of the initial external intrusion and the following internal
compromise make it challenging for the defender to identify the set of nodes that have been compromised. Thus, the
defender needs to patch and reset all suspicious nodes at all stages to deter the attacks, which can be cost-prohibitive.
Honeypots are a promising active defense method to detect and deter these persistent and stealthy attacks by
deception. Since regular honeypots are implemented at fixed locations and on machines that are never involved in the
regular operation, advanced attacks such as APTs can identify the honeypots and avoid accessing them. Motivated
by the roaming honeypot [7] and the fact that the service links at each stage only involve a small number of nodes,
we develop the following cognitive honeypot configuration that utilizes and reconfigures different idle nodes at
different stages as honeypots.
Let VD ⊆ V be the subset of nodes that can be reconfigured as honeypots when idle. At each stage k, the
defender randomly selects a node nkw ∈ VD to be the potential honeypot and creates a random honey link from other
nodes to nkw. Since disguising a honeypot as a normal node requires emulating massive services and the continuous
monitoring of all inbound network flows are costly, we assume that the defender sets up at most one honeypot and
monitors one honey link at each stage.
As shown in Fig. 2, U1, H2, and H3 are idle at stage k0+1 and U1 is reconfigured as the honeypot. The link
from H3 to U1 is the honey link which is monitored by the defender. At stage k0, U2 is the only idle node and it
is reconfigured as the honeypot with a honey link from U1 to U2. As stated in Section II-B, the attacker who has
obtained U1’s root privilege at stage k0 does not interfere with any normal operations to remain stealthy. Thus, the
defender can still reconfigure U1 as a honeypot at stage k0+1. However, the honeypot of U1 at stage k0+1 cannot
identify the attacker by monitoring all the inbound traffic as he has already compromised U1. On the contrary,
the honeypots at stage k0 and k0+2 can trap the attacker as he has compromised U1 and may mistake the honey
links as service links for lateral movement. The defender should avoid applying honey links from the target node
7to the honeypot. If the attacker has not compromised the target node H3 as shown in stage k0 + 1, the honeypot
cannot capture the attacker. If the attacker has compromised the target node as shown in stage k0+3, then the late
detection cannot reduce the loss that has already been made. Theoretically, the honeypot can achieve zero false
alarms as all legitimate network flows should occur only at the service links. For example, although the existence
of the honey link at stage k0 enables legitimate users at U1 to access another user’s computer U2, a legitimate user
aiming to finish the service request from U1 to H1 should not access any irrelevant nodes other than host H1. On
the other hand, an attacker at U1 cannot tell whether the links from U1 to H1 and H2 are service links or honey
links. Thus, only an attacker at U1 has the probability to access the honeypot H2 at stage k0.
1) Random Honeypot Configuration and Identification: Since the defender cannot predict future service links
nor determine the set of compromised nodes at the current stage, she needs to develop a time-independent policy
γ := {γl,w},∀nkl ,nkw ∈ V , to determine the honeypot location and the honey link at each stage k to minimize the
risk that an attacker from the node of the initial intrusion can compromise the target node after ∆k stages. Each
policy element γl,w is the probability that the honeypot is node nkw and the honey link is from node nkl to n
k
w at stage
k ∈ {k0, · · · ,k0+∆k}. Note that γi,i = 0,∀i ∈ V , and we can let nl,nw belongs to the entire node set V without loss
of generality because if a node nw /∈ VD is not reconfigurable, then we can let the probability γl,w be zero. Define
n j0 ∈ V \VI as the target node to protect for all stages and the target node is segregated from the set of potential
initial intrusion. Then, defender should avoid honey links from node n j0 for all stages, i.e., γ j0,w = 0,∀nw ∈ V . If a
honey link from nl to nw is not available for all stages due to the physical segregation or other security methods,
e.g., a link from U1 to H3, then γl,w = 0. Since at most one link is allowed, we have the constraint ∑nl ,nw∈V γl,w = 1.
In this work, we assume that the honeypot policy γ is not affected by the realization of the service links at each
stage1 and thus can interfere with the service links as defined in Definition 2. If the honeypot nkw selected by the
policy γ is interfering, then the defender does not monitor or filter the inbound network flows to avoid interference
with the normal operation.
Definition 2. A honeypot nkw ∈ V at stage k is said to be interfering if nkw is the source or the sink node of any
service link at stage k.
Although we increase the difficulty for the attacker to identify the honeypot by applying it to idle nodes in the
network and change its location at every stage, we cannot eliminate the possibility of advanced attackers identifying
the honeypot [5]. If the attacker has compromised node ni before stage k and there is a honey link from node nki to
nkj at stage k, then we assume that the attacker has probability qi, j ∈ [0,1] to identify the honey link and choose not
to access the honeypot. If the honeypot is not identified, then the attacker accesses the honeypot and he is detected
by the defender. We assume the defender can deter the lateral movement completely after a detection from any
single honeypot by patching or resetting all nodes at that stage.
As stated in Section II-B, the attacker can move simultaneously from all the compromised nodes to multiple
nodes through service links that connect them. For example, the attacker at stage k0+2 can compromise H2 and H1
through the two service links and may also reach the honeypot if the attacker attempts to compromise H3 from U1.
However, we assume that the attacker at a compromised node does not move consecutively through multiple service
links, or honey links defined in Section II-C as the attacker cannot distinguish honey links from service links, in
a single stage to remain stealthy. Contrary to the persistent lateral movement over a long time period, consecutive
attack moves within one stage make it easier for the defender to connect all the indicators of compromise (IoC)
and attribute the attacker. Take Fig. 2 as an example. Suppose that there are two links, e.g. , H1 to U2 and U2 to
H2 at a stage k, where each link can be either a service link or a honey link. If the attacker has only compromised
H1 among these three nodes, then he only attempts to compromise node U2 rather than both U2 and H2 during
stage k.
2) Interference, Stealthiness, and Cost of Honeypot Roaming: In this section, we define three critical security
metrics for a cognitive honeypot to achieve low interference, low cost, and high stealthiness. Define VS as the set
of all the subsets of V . Define a series of binary random variables xkv,w,v′ ∈ {0,1},v,v′ ∈ VS,nkw ∈ V , where xkv,w,v′
means that there are no direct service links from any node nkl ∈ v to node nkw and from nkw to nkl ∈ v′ at stage k.
Thus, Pr(xkv,w,v′ = 1) =∏nkl ∈v(1−βl,w)∏nkl′∈v′(1−βw,l′) represents the probability that the honeypot at n
k
w does not
1 The future work would consider a feedback honeypot policy based on the information of the service links at the current stage. The
information set is finite yet huge; i.e., there are 2N
2
possible combinations for the realization of service links at a stage.
8interfere with any service link whose source node is in set v and sink node is in v′. Then, we can define HPoI(γ)
as the probability of interference in Definition 3. A cognitive honeypot requires the defender to utilize only idle
nodes as honeypots with a low probability of interfering. To reduce HPoI(γ), the defender can design γ based on
the value of β , i.e., the frequency/probability of all potential service links.
Definition 3. The probability of interference (PoI) for any honeypot policy γ is
HPoI(γ) := ∑
nh∈V
∑
nw∈V \{nh}
γh,w(1−Pr(xkV \{nw},w,V \{nw} = 1))
= ∑
nw∈V
(1−Pr(xkV \{nw},w,V \{nw} = 1)) ∑
nh∈V \{nw}
γh,w.
(1)
Since the attacker can learn the honeypot policy γ , the defender prefers the policy to be as random as possible
to increase the stealthiness of the honeypot. A fully random policy that assigns equal probability to all possible
honey links provides forward and backward security; i.e., even if an attacker identifies the honeypot at stage k, he
cannot use that information to deduce the location of the honeypots in the following and previous stages. We use
HSL(γ), the entropy of γ in Definition 4 as a measure for the stealthiness level of the honeypot policy where we
define 0 · log0 = 0.
Definition 4. The stealthiness level (SL) for any γ is HSL(γ) := ∑nh,nw∈V γh,w log(γh,w).
A tradeoff of roaming honeypots is the cost to reconfigure the idle nodes when the defender changes the location
of the honeypot and the honey link. Define the term C(γh1,w1 ,γh2,w2),∀nh1 ,nh2 ,nw1 ,nw2 ∈ V , as the cost of changing
a (nh1 − nw1) honey link to a (nh2 − nw2) honey link. If only the location change of honeypots incurs a cost, we
can let C(γh1,w,γh2,w) = 0,∀h1 6= h2,∀nw ∈ V , without loss of generality. Then, we can define the cost of roaming
in Definition 5.
Definition 5. The cost of roaming (CoR) for any honeypot policy γ is
HCoR(γ) := ∑
nh1∈V
∑
nw1∈V \{nh1}
γh1,w1(1−Pr(xkV \{nw1},w1,V \{nw1} = 1))
· ∑
nh2∈V
∑
nw2∈V \{h2}
γh2,w2(1−Pr(xkV \{nw2},w2,V \{nw2} = 1)) ·C(γh1,w1 ,γh2,w2)
(2)
III. COGNITIVE HONEYPOT FOR LTV MINIMIZATION
Throughout the entire operation of the enterprise network, the defender does not know whether, when, and where
the initial intrusion has happened. The defender also cannot know the attack path of the lateral movement until a
honeypot detects the attack. Therefore, the honeypot policy γ aims to reduce the vulnerability of the target node
proactively and persistently, once the adversarial lateral movement happens after the initial intrusion at an unknown
initial stage k0.
Given the target node n j0 ∈ V \VI , a subset v ∈ VS, and the defender’s honeypot policy γ , we define g j0(v,γ,∆k)
as the probability that an attacker who has compromised the set of nodes v can compromise the target node n j0
within ∆k stages. Since the initial compromise happens only to a single node ni ∈ VI independently with probability
ρi as argued in Section II-B, the ∆k-stage vulnerability of the target node n j0 defined in Definition 6 equals
g¯∆kj0,VI (γ) := ∑ni∈VI ρig j0({ni},γ,∆k).
Definition 6. Define the ∆k-stage vulnerability of the target node n j0 as the probability that an attacker with the
initial intrusion set VI can compromise the target node n j0 within a time window of ∆k stages.
The length of the time window represents the time-sensitivity of the defender’s demand for long-term security.
For example, suppose that the defender can detect and deter the attacker after the initial intrusion yet with a delay
due to the high rate of false alarms. If the delay can be contained within ∆k0 stages, then the defender should choose
the honeypot policy to minimize the ∆k0-stage vulnerability. Consider a given threshold T0 ∈ [0,1], we define the
concept of level-T0 stage-∆k security for node n j0 and honeypot policy γ in Definition 7.
Definition 7. Policy γ achieves level-T0 stage-∆k security for node n j0 if g¯
∆k
j0,VI
(γ)≤ T0.
9Finally, we define the defender’s decision problem of a cognitive honeypot that can minimize the LTV for the
target node with a low PoI, a high SL, and a low CoR in (3). The coefficients αPoI,αSL,αCoR represent the tradeoffs
of ∆k-stage vulnerabilities with PoI, SL, and CoR, respectively.
min
γ
g¯∆kj0,VI (γ)+αPoIHPoI(γ)−αSLHSL(γ)+αCoRHCoR(γ)
s.t. ∑
nh,nw∈V
γh,w = 1,
γh,w = 0,∀nh ∈ V ,nw ∈ V \VD,
(3)
A. Immediate Vulnerability
We first compute the probability that an initial intrusion at node ni ∈ VI can compromise the target node n j0 ∈
V \VI within ∆k = 0 stages. The term γi,w(1−qi,w) is the probability that the attacker with initial intrusion at node
i is trapped by the honeypot at node nw. Since the attacker does not take consecutive movements in one stage to
remain stealthy as stated in Section II-B, g j0({ni},γ,0) equals the product of the probability that attacker exploits
the service link from ni to n j0 successfully and the probability that the attacker is not trapped by the honeypot, i.e.,
g j0({ni},γ,0) = βi, j0λi, j0(1− ∑
w6=i, j0
Pr(xkV \{nw},w,V \{nw} = 1)γi,w(1−qi,w)),∀ni ∈ VI. (4)
B. ∆k-stage Vulnerability
Define Vi, j0 ⊆ VS as the set of all the subsets of V \ {ni,n j0}. For each v ∈ Vi, j0 , define V vi, j0 as the set
of all the subsets of V \ {ni,n j0 ,v}. Define the shorthand notation fv,u(β ,λ ) := ∏nh1∈vβi,h1λi,h1 ∏nh2∈uβi,h2(1−
λi,h2)∏nh3∈V \{ni,n j0 ,v,u}(1−βi,h3) as the probability that the attacker with initial intrusion at node ni has compromised
the service links from ni to all nodes in set v ∈ Vi, j0 , yet fails to compromise the remaining service links from ni
to all nodes in set u ∈ V vi, j0 . We can compute g j0({ni},γ,∆k) based on the following induction, i.e.,
g j0({ni},γ,∆k) = g j0({ni},γ,0)+(1−βi, j0λi, j0) ∑
v∈Vi, j0
∑
u∈V vi, j0
fv,u(β ,λ )(1−
∑
nw∈V \{ni,v,u}
Pr(xkV \{ni,nw},w,V \{nw} = 1)γi,w(1−qi,w))g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1).
(5)
C. Optimal Pessimistic and Optimistic Honeypot Policy
For a given γ , we can write out the explicit form of g j0({ni} ∪ v,γ,∆k− 1) as in (4) and (5). However, the
complexity increases dramatically with the cardinality of set v because the event that the attacker can compromise
target node n j0 within ∆k stages from node ni is not independent of the event that the attacker can achieve the
same compromise from node nh 6= ni. Thus, we use the union bound
g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k)≥ maxn j∈{ni}∪v g j0({n j},γ,∆k),
g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k)≤min(1, ∑
n j∈{ni}∪v
g j0({n j},γ,∆k)).
to simplify the computation and provide a upper bound and a lower bound for g j0({ni}∪v,γ,∆k),v 6= /0, in (6) and
(7), respectively. With the initial condition glowerj0 ({n j},γ,0) = g
upper
j0
({n j},γ,0) = g j0({n j},γ,0),∀n j ∈ {ni}∪v, we
obtain the following induction for all ∆k ∈ Z+, i.e.,
glowerj0 ({ni},γ,∆k) = g j0({ni},γ,0)+(1−βi, j0λi, j0) ∑
v∈Vi, j0
∑
u∈V vi, j0
fv,u(β ,λ )(1−
∑
nw∈V \{ni,v,u}
Pr(xkV \{ni,nw},w,V \{nw} = 1)γi,w(1−qi,w)) maxn j∈{ni}∪v g
lower
j0 ({n j},γ,∆k−1).
(6)
gupperj0 ({ni},γ,∆k) = g j0({ni},γ,0)+(1−βi, j0λi, j0) ∑
v∈Vi, j0
∑
u∈V vi, j0
fv,u(β ,λ )(1−
∑
nw∈V \{ni,v,u}
Pr(xkV \{ni,nw},w,V \{nw} = 1)γi,w(1−qi,w))min(1, ∑
n j∈{ni}∪v
gupperj0 ({n j},γ,∆k)).
(7)
10
Let us define the term g¯∆k,lowerj0,VI (γ) := ∑ni∈VI ρig
lower
j0 ({ni},γ,∆k) and g¯
∆k,upper
j0,VI
(γ) := ∑ni∈VI ρig
upper
j0
({ni},γ,∆k) as
the pessimistic and optimistic estimates of the ∆k-stage vulnerability of the target node n j0 , respectively. Thus,
replacing g¯∆kj0,VI (γ) in (3) with g¯
∆k,lower
j0,VI
(γ) and g¯∆k,upperj0,VI (γ), we obtain the optimal pessimistic and optimistic honeypot
policy γ∗,lower and γ∗,upper, respectively.
We propose the following iterative algorithm to compute these two honeypot policies. We use γ∗,lower as an
example and γ∗,upper can be computed in the same fashion. First, we consider any feasible honeypot policy γ t and
compute glowerj0 ({ni},γ,∆k′),∀ni ∈ VI,∀∆k′ ∈ {1, · · · ,∆k}, via (6). Then, we solve (3) by replacing g¯∆kj0,VI (γ) with
g¯∆k,lowerj0,VI (γ) and plugging in g
lower
j0 ({ni},γ t ,∆k),∀ni ∈ VI , as constants. Since g¯
∆k,lower
j0,VI
(γ),HPoI(γ),HCoR(γ) are all
linear with respect to γ , the objective function of the constrained optimization in (3) is a linear function of γ plus
the entropy regularization HSL(γ). Then, we can solve the constrained optimization in closed form and update the
honeypot policy from γ t to γ t+1. Given a small error threshold ε > 0, the above iteration process can be repeated
until there exists a T1 ∈ Z+ such that a proper matrix norm is less than the error threshold, i.e., ||γT1+1− γT1 || ≤ ε .
Then, we can output γT1+1 as the optimal pessimistic policy γ∗,lower.
Algorithm 1: Optimal Pessimistic (and Optimistic) Honeypot Policy
1 Initialization VI,n j0 ∈ V \VI,∆k ∈ Z+,ε > 0,γ0;
2 while ||γ t+1− γ t ||> ε do
3 t := t+1;
4 for ∆k′ = 1, · · · ,∆k do
5 for i ∈ VI do
6 Compute glowerj0 ({ni},γ0,∆k′) via (6);
7 end
8 end
9 Replace g¯∆kj0,VI (γ) with g¯
∆k,lower
j0,VI
(γ) and plug in glowerj0 ({ni},γ t ,∆k),∀ni ∈ VI;
10 Obtain γ t+1 as the solution of (3);
11 if ||γ t+1− γ t || ≤ ε then
12 T1 = t;
13 Terminate
14 end
15 Output γ∗,lower = γT1+1.
D. ∆k-Stage Vulnerability Analysis under Heuristic Policies
Besides the optimal pessimistic and optimistic policies, the defender can also apply honeypots according to other
heuristic policies. In Section III-D2 and III-D1, we analyze the ∆k-stage vulnerability for a target node n j0 ∈ V \VI
under two types of honeypot policies with or without direct honey links from node ni ∈ VI , respectively.
1) Indirect Honeypot Links: For an initial intrusion at node ni ∈ VI , honey links with source nodes other than
ni are able to capture the attacker in the following stages due to the adversarial lateral movement. Thus, in this
subsection, we analyze the ∆k-stage vulnerability when there are no direct honey links from the initial intrusion
node ni, i.e., γi,w = 0,∀nw ∈ V , or the attacker can always identify the honey links, i.e., qi,w = 1,∀nw ∈ V . This
indirect honeypot policy represents the scenario where the defender has excluded node ni mistakenly from the set
VI that the initial intrusion can happen. Or it represents a powerful attacker who can identify all the honey links
from node ni. Due to the capability mismatch between the honeypot and the attacker under the indirect honeypot
policy, the vulnerability of any target node increases strictly with the length of the time window and converges to
the maximum value of 1 as shown in Proposition 1. This means that the attacker can always compromise the target
node given sufficiently long stages of lateral movement.
Proposition 1. If γi,w(1−qi,w) = 0,∀nw ∈ V , then g j0({ni},γ,∆k) ∈ [0,1] is an non-decreasing function regarding
variable ∆k for all n j0 ∈ V \VI,ni ∈ VI . The value of function does not increase to 1 as ∆k increases to infinity if
and only if βi, j0λi, j0 = 0 and g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1) = g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1),∀v ∈ VS,∀∆k ∈ Z+.
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Proof. If γi,w(1−qi,w) = 0,∀nw ∈ V , we can use the facts that g j0({ni}∪v,γ,∆k−1)≥ g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1),∀γ,n j0 ∈
V ,ni ∈ VI,∆k ≥ 0,∀v ∈ VS, and
∑
v∈Vi, j0
∑
u∈V vi, j0
fv,u(β ,λ )≡ 1,∀β ,λ ,
to obtain
g j0({ni},γ,∆k) = βi, j0λi, j0 +(1−βi, j0λi, j0) ∑
v∈Vi, j0
∑
u∈V vi, j0
fv,u(β ,λ )g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1)
≥ βi, j0λi, j0 +(1−βi, j0λi, j0)g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1)≥ g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1),
(8)
for all ∆k∈Z+. The inequality is an equality if and only if βi, j0λi, j0 = 0 and g j0({ni}∪v,γ,∆k−1)= g j0({ni},γ,∆k−
1),∀v ∈ VS,∀∆k ∈ Z+.
Besides honeypot policy γ , the ∆k-stage vulnerability also depends on the probability/frequency of service links,
i.e., the value of β , and the probability of a successful compromise through the service links, i.e., the value of
λ . In the constrained optimization problem (3), we assume that the defender cannot design β and λ and they are
given as known parameters. In the rest of this subsection, we briefly investigate the possibility of design β and
λ to reduce the ∆k-stage vulnerability. To reduce β j1, j2 ,∀n j1 ,n j2 ∈ V , the defender needs to sacrifice operation
efficiency and reduce the arrival probability/frequency of the service link from n j1 to n j2 . To reduce the probability
of a successful compromise from node n j1 to n j2 , i.e., λ j1, j2 ,∀n j1 ,n j2 ∈ V , the defender can enhance the service
link from n j1 to n j2 or demotivate the attacker to initiate the compromise by disguising the service link as a honey
link.
The term r := (1−βi, j0λi, j0)∑u∈V /0i, j0 f /0,u(β ,λ ) ∈ (0,1) represents the probability that there is no direct link from
ni to target n j0 and the attacker at node ni does not attempt to or fails to compromise all the service links from
node ni. In (8) where γi,w(1−qi,w) = 0,∀nw ∈ V , we can upper bound the term g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1) by 1 for all
v 6= /0, which leads to
g j0({ni},γ,∆k) = (1− r) ·g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1)+ r ·g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1)
≤ (1− r)+ r ·g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1)
= 1− r∆k + r∆kg j0({ni},γ,0) = 1− r∆k(1−βi, j0λi, j0),
(9)
where the final line results from solving the first-order linear difference equation iteratively by ∆k−1 times.
If r = 1, i.e., βi, j0λi, j0 = 0,λi, j = 0,∀n j ∈ V , then the ∆k-stage vulnerability remains the same as the 0-stage
vulnerability, i.e., g j0({ni},γ,∆k) = g j0({ni},γ,0) = 0 for any finite ∆k ∈ Z+. Thus, no lateral movement can
happen from the initial compromise node ni ∈ VI for any finite ∆k ∈ Z+ \∞ and we achieve 0 vulnerability for
the target node j0 for any length of the time window ∆k ∈ Z+. However, r = 1 is a restrictive condition which
requires the attacker to fail the compromise from node ni to any node n j with probability 1, i.e., λi, j = 0,∀n j ∈ V .
In Proposition 2, we relax the r = 1 to r≥ 1−m/∆k for any finite m ∆k to guarantee a level-(βi, j0λi, j0), stage-∞
security defined in Definition 7. The proof follows directly from a limit analysis based on (9).
Proposition 2. Consider the scenario where γi,w(1− qi,w) is 0 for all nw ∈ V and r is a function of ∆k with
parameters m ∈ R\{0} and n ∈ R+, i.e., r = 1−m∆k−n.
(1). If (1− r)/m is of the same order with 1/∆k, i.e., n = 1, then the limit of the upper bound lim∆k→∞ 1− r∆k(1−
βi, j0λi, j0) is a constant 1− e−m(1−βi, j0λi, j0) ∈ (0,1).
(2). If (1−r)/m is of higher order, i.e., n> 1, then the limit of the upper bound is g j0({ni},γ,0) = βi, j0λi, j0 ∈ (0,1).
(3). If (1− r)/m is of lower order, i.e., n < 1, then the limit of the upper bound is 1.
The equality holds if and only if βi, j0λi, j0 = 1. Based on the fact that 1− e−m(1−βi, j0λi, j0)≥ βi, j0λi, j0 , we can
conclude that if r ≥ 1−m/∆k for any finite m ∆k, then the ∞-stage vulnerability of target node n j0 is upper
bounded by βi, j0λi, j0 and thus achieves the level-(βi, j0λi, j0), stage-∞ security as defined in Definition 7. Note that
If the target node is segregated from the initial intrusion set, i.e., there is no direct service link from node ni to
the target node n j0 , then βi, j0λi, j0 = 0 and the target node n j0 can achieve a zero vulnerability for infinite length of
time window.
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In (9), we provide the explicit upper bound of target node n j0’s ∆k-stage vulnerability for any ∆k ≥ 0 based on
the current β ,λ . In Proposition 2, we further provide the defender a critical threshold of r = 1−m/∆k to guide
the design and modification of the current β ,λ and fulfill a higher level of long-term security.
2) Direct Honeypot Links: Consider a deterministic policy γi,w0 = 1,nw0 ∈ V \{ni,n j0}, which applies a direct
honey link from the initial intrusion node ni to node nw0 . Then, we obtain the corresponding ∆k-stage vulnerability
and an explicit lower bound in (10) based on (5) by using the inequality g j0({ni}∪v,γ,∆k−1)≥ g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1).
Define shorthand notations k1 :=∏l 6=w0(1−βl,w0)(1−βw0,l)(1−qi,w0) ∈ [0,1] and k2 := ∑v∈Vi, j0\{nw0}∑u∈V vi, j0\{w0}
fv,u(β ,λ ) ≤ ∑v∈Vi, j0 ∑u∈V vi, j0 fv,u(β ,λ ) = 1. Note that k1 = 0 is a very restrictive condition as it requires that both
the honeypot nw0 is not interfering as defined in Definition 2 and the attacker can never identify the honey link
from ni to nw0 , i.e., qi,w0 = 0.
g j0({ni},γ,∆k) = βi, j0λi, j0 [1− ∏
l 6=w0
(1−βl,w0)(1−βw0,l)(1−qi,w0)]+
(1−βi, j0λi, j0)[ ∑
v∈Vi, j0
∑
u∈V vi, j0
fv,u(β ,λ )g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1)− ∑
v∈Vi, j0\{nw0}
∑
u∈V vi, j0\{nw0}
fv,u(β ,λ ) · ∏
l 6=i,w0
(1−βl,w0) ∏
l′ 6=w0
(1−βw0,l′)(1−qi,w0)g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1)]
≥ βi, j0λi, j0(1− k1)+(1−βi, j0λi, j0)[1− k1k2(1−βi,w0)]g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1).
(10)
Define a shorthand notation r2 := (1−βi, j0λi, j0)[1−k1k2(1−βi,w0)], we can solve the linear difference equation in
the final step of (10) to obtain an explicit lower bound g j0({ni},γ,∆k) ≤ T lower,12 := βi, j0λi, j0(1− k1)1−(r2)
∆k+1
1−r2 for
all ∆k ∈ Z+.
According to the first equality in (10), we also obtain an explicit upper bound for g j0({ni},γ,∆k),∀∆k ∈ Z+, in
Lemma 1 by using the inequality g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k) ≤ 1. Note that we can obtain a tighter upper bound with a
more complicated explicit form by bounding the term g j0({ni}∪ v,γ,∆k−1) by 1 only if v is not empty and then
solve the resulted linear difference equation correspondingly.
Lemma 1. If γi,w0 = 1,w0 6= i, j0, then g j0({ni},γ,∆k) is upper bounded by T upper,12 := 1− βi, j0λi, j0k1 − (1−
βi, j0λi, j0)k1k2(1−βi,w0) ∈ [0,1] for all ∆k ∈ Z+. The bound T upper,12 < 1 is non-trivial if βi, j0λi, j0 6= 0,βi, j0λi, j0 6= 1,
and k1k2(1−βi,w0) 6= 0.
Proposition 3. If βi, j0λi, j0 6= 0 and γi,w0 = 1,w0 6= i, j0, then
(1). The term T lower,22 :=
βi, j0λi, j0 (1−k1)
(1−βi, j0λi, j0 )k1k2(1−βi,w0 )+βi, j0λi, j0
∈ [0,1) is strictly less than 1 and the value 0 is achieved
only if k1 = 1.
(2). If g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1)< T lower,22 , then g j0({ni},γ,∆k)> g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1).
(3). The term lim∆k→∞ g j0({ni},γ,∆k) is lower bounded by max(T lower,12 ,T lower,22 ).
Proof. Based on the first equality in (10), we obtain that if g j0({ni},γ,∆k− 1) < T lower,22 , then g j0({ni},γ,∆k) >
g j0({ni},γ,∆k−1). Since the above is true for all ∆k ∈ Z+, we know that the ∆k-stage vulnerability increases with
∆k strictly until it has reach T lower,22 . When βi, j0λi, j0 6= 0 and k1 6= 1, T lower,22 strictly greater than 0 is a non-trivial
lower bound. The other lower bound T lower,12 comes from Lemma 1.
In this subsection, we consider an advantageous scenario for the defender as the initial intrusion can only happen
to a single node ni. Lemma 1 shows that if the defender applies a direct honeypot from ni in a deterministic
fashion, then the ∆k-stage vulnerability is always upper bounded. However, this direct policy cannot reduce the
∞-stage vulnerability to zero and the ∆k-stage vulnerability still increases with ∆k until the value is greater than
the threshold T lower,22 . After combining the results with the ones in Proposition 1, we can conclude that comparing
with the indirect honeypot policy, the direct policy can mitigate the LTV of the target node yet within a certain
degree.
IV. CONCLUSION
Stealthy and persistent lateral movement of APTs poses a severe security challenge to enterprise networks.
Honeypots, as a promising deceptive defense method, can detect lateral movement attacks at their early stages with
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a negligible false positive rate. Since advanced attackers, such as APTs, can identify the honeypots located at fixed
machines not in the production system, we propose a cognitive honeypot mechanism which reconfigures different
idle production nodes as honeypot at different stages based on the probability of service links and the probability of
successful compromise. The time-expanded network is used to model the time of the random service occurrence and
the adversarial compromise explicitly. Besides the main objective of reducing the long-term vulnerability of the target
node against lateral movement attacks, we also consider the level of stealthiness, the probability of interference, and
the cost of roaming as three tradeoffs of the long-term security. To reduce the computation complexity, we propose
an iterative algorithm and approximate the vulnerability with the union bound. The results of the vulnerability
analysis under the optimal and heuristic honeypot policies demonstrate that the proposed cognitive honeypot can
effectively protect the target node from the lateral movement attack.
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